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In an adaptive population which models financial markets and distributed control, we consider
how the dynamics depends on the diversity of the agents’ initial preferences of strategies. When
the diversity decreases, more agents tend to adapt their strategies together. This change in the
environment results in dynamical transitions from vanishing to non-vanishing step sizes. When
the diversity decreases further, we find a cascade of dynamical transitions for the different signal
dimensions, supported by good agreement between simulations and theory. Besides, the signal of
the largest step size at the steady state is likely to be the initial signal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many natural and artificial systems consist of a pop-
ulation of agents with coupled dynamics. Through their
mutual adaptation, they are able to exhibit interesting
collective behavior. Although the individuals are com-
peting to maximize their own payoffs, the system is able
to self-organize itself to globally efficient states. Exam-
ples can be found in economic markets and communica-
tion networks [1, 2, 3, 4].
An important factor affecting the behavior of an adap-
tive population is the dependence of the payoffs on the
environment experienced by the individual agents. The
payoffs facilitate the agents to assess the preferences of
their decisions, hence inducing them to take certain ac-
tions when they experience similar dynamical environ-
ment in the future. Thus, the payoff function is crucial
to the mechanism of adaptation.
As a prototype of an adaptive population, the Minor-
ity Game (MG) considers the dynamics of the buyers and
sellers in a model of the financial market, in which the
minority group is the winning one [2]. A good indicator
of the mutual adaptation of the agents is the reduction
of the variance of the buyer population to values below
those of random fluctuations [2]. Furthermore, this vari-
ance has a universal dependence on the complexity of
the strategies adopted by the agents, dropping to a mini-
mum when the complexity is reduced to a universal criti-
cal value, and rapidly rising thereafter [5, 6]. Theoretical
studies using the replica method [7, 8] and the generating
functional [9, 10] confirmed these general trends.
The agents in the original version of MG uses a step
payoff function [2, 5, 6], meaning that the payoffs re-
ceived by the winning group are the same, irrespective of
the winning margin (the difference between the majority
and minority group). Latter versions of MG uses a linear
payoff function [7, 8, 9, 10], in which the payoffs increase
with the winning margin. Other payoff functions yield
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the same macroscopic behavior in their dependence of
the population variance on the complexity of strategies
[11, 12]. Thus, the behavior of the population is universal
as long as the payoff function favors the minority group.
A recent extension of the MG considers payoff functions
which reward the minority agents only when they win by
a large margin, but punish them when the winning mar-
gin is small [13]. The extended model displays a smooth
crossover from a minority game to a majority game when
the payoff function is tuned.
However, when one considers details beyond the popu-
lation variance, one can find that the agents self-organize
in different ways induced by different payoff functions.
For a payoff function that favors a large winning mar-
gin, the distribution of the buyer population is doubled-
peaked [2]. This shows that the dynamics of the pop-
ulation self-organizes to favor large winning margins of
either the buyers or sellers, since the agents have adapted
themselves to maximize their payoffs.
In this paper, we compare the behavior of MGs using
step and linear payoffs. Previously, we found that the
population variance scales as a power law of the diversity
for a step payoff [14, 15]. Diversity refers to the variance
of the initial biases of the strategy payoffs of the agents.
In a population with diverse preferences of strategies, the
adaptation rate is slow, resulting in small fluctuations of
the buyer or seller population. As we shall see, when the
payoff function becomes linear, the scaling relation be-
tween the variance and the diversity for the step payoff
is replaced by a continuous dynamical transition from a
vanishing variance at high diversity to a finite variance at
low diversity. The dynamical transition is due to the pay-
offs being enhanced by large winning margins at low di-
versity. Furthermore, for systems with multi-dimensional
signals feeding the strategies, the dynamical transition in
each dimension do not take place at the same transition
point. Rather, there is a cascade of dynamical transitions
for the different signal dimensions. This rich behavior
demonstrates the flexibility of an adaptive population for
self-organizing to states in which agents maximize their
payoffs, and is hence important in the modeling of eco-
nomics and distributed control.
2II. THE MINORITY GAME
The Minority Game model consists a population of N
agents competing for limited resources, N being odd [2].
Each agent makes a decision 1 or 0 at each time step,
and the minority group wins. For economic markets, the
decisions 1 and 0 correspond to buying and selling re-
spectively, so that the buyers can win by belonging to the
minority group, which pushes the price down, and vice
versa. For typical control tasks such as the distribution
of shared resources, the decisions 1 and 0 may represent
two alternative resources, so that less agents utilizing a
resource implies more abundance. The decisions of each
agent are responses to the environment of the game, de-
scribed by signal µ∗(t) at time t, where µ∗(t) = 1, ..., D.
These responses are prescribed by strategies, which are
binary functions mapping the D signals to decisions 1 or
0. In this paper, we consider endogenous signals, which
are the history of the winning bits in the most recent m
steps. Thus, the strategies have an input dimension of
D = 2m, and the parameter α ≡ D/N is referred to as
the complexity. Before the game starts, each agent ran-
domly picks s strategies. Out of her s strategies, each
agent makes decisions according to the most successful
one at each step. The success of a strategy is measured
by its cumulative payoff, as explained below.
Let ξµi (t) = ±1 when the decisions of strategy a are
1 or 0 respectively, responding to signal µ. Let a∗(i, t)
be the strategy adopted by agent i at time t. Then
A(t) ≡ ∑i ξµ∗(t)a∗(i,t)/N is the excess demand of the game
at time t. The payoff received by strategy a is then
−ξµ∗(t)a ϕ(
√
NA(t)), where ϕ is the payoff function. For
step and linear payoffs, ϕ(χ) = sgnχ and χ respectively.
(Here, we have implicitly assumed that an agent does not
consider the impact of adopting a strategy, although the
excess demand is only dependent on the adopted ones.)
Let Ωa(t) be the cumulative payoff of strategy a at time
t. Then its updating dynamics is described by
Ωa(t+ 1) = Ωa(t)− ξµ
∗(t)
a ϕ(
√
NA(t)). (1)
Diversity of initial preferences of strategies is introduced
by adding random biases ωia to the cumulative payoffs of
strategy a (a= 2, ..., s) of agent i with respect to her first
one. The biases are drawn from a Gaussian or binomial
distribution with mean 0 and variance R. The ratio ρ ≡
R/N is referred to as the diversity.
To monitor the mutual adaptive behavior of the popu-
lation, we measure the variance σ2/N of the population
making decision 1, defined by
σ2
N
≡ N
4
〈[Aµ∗(t)(t)− 〈Aµ∗(t)(t)〉]2〉 (2)
where the average is taken over time when the system
reaches the steady state, and over the random distribu-
tion of strategies and biases.
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FIG. 1: σ2/N versus α with linear payoffs, for ρ=0, 0.25,
1, 4, respectively, N=251, s=2, 1000 samples. Inset: The
corresponding plot for step payoffs.
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FIG. 2: σ2/N versus ρ with linear payoffs, α =
0.002, 0.01, 0.02 for different m and N ; Inset: σ2/N versus
ρ with step payoffs with m = 1, N = 127, 511, 2047, 8191 re-
spectively. Dashed-dotted line: scaling prediction. For both
payoffs, s=2, 1000 samples.
III. DYNAMICAL TRANSITIONS
As shown in Fig. 1, the dependence of the variance
σ2/N on the complexity α for linear payoffs is very sim-
ilar to that for step payoffs [14, 15]. For α above a uni-
versal critical value αc(≈ 0.3), the variance drops when
α is reduced. The effects of introducing the diversity is
also similar to that for step payoffs, namely, the variance
remains unaffected when α > αc, but decreases signifi-
cantly with the diversity when α < αc.
However, there are differences when one goes beyond
this general trend. As shown in Fig. 2, the variance
curves at different values of α cross at at ρ = ρc ≈ 0.16,
indicating the existence of a continuous phase transition
at ρc from a phase of vanishing variance at large ρ to a
phase of finite variance at small ρ.
This behavior is very different from that for step pay-
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FIG. 3: The attractor dynamics when (a) |∆A1| is larger, (b)
|∆A0| is larger.
offs, where the variance scales as ρ−1 and there are no
dynamical transitions (Fig. 2 inset). The picture is con-
firmed by analyzing the dynamics of the game for small
m. The dynamics can be conveniently described by intro-
ducing the D-dimensional vector Aµ(t) ≡ ∑i ξµa∗(i,t)/N .
While only one of the D signals corresponds to the histor-
ical signal µ∗(t) of the game, the augmentation toD com-
ponents is necessary to describe the attractor structure of
the game dynamics. Fig. 3 illustrates the attractor struc-
ture in this phase space for the visualizable case ofm = 1.
The dynamics proceeds in the direction which tends to
reduce the magnitude of the components of Aµ(t) [7].
However, the components of Aµ(t) overshoot, resulting
in periodic attractors of period 2D. For m = 1, the
attractor is described by the sequence µ∗(t) = 0, 1, 1, 0,
and takes the L-shape as shown in Fig. 3 [15]. Note that
the displacements in the two directions may not have the
same amplitude.
Following steps similar to those in [15], we find that for
m not too large, and for convergence within time steps
much less than
√
R,
Aµ(t+ 1) = Aµ(t)−
√
2
piR
ϕ(
√
NAµ(t))δµµ∗(t). (3)
For step payoffs, Eq. (3) converges to an attractor con-
fined in a D-dimensional hypercube of size
√
2/piR, irre-
spective of the value of R. On the other hand, for linear
payoffs, Aµ(t+1) becomes a linear function of Aµ(t) with
a slope of 1−
√
2/piρ. Hence, for ρ > ρc = 1/2pi ∼ 0.16,
the step sizes |Aµ(t+1)−Aµ(t) | converge to zero, whereas
for ρ < ρc, steps of vanishing sizes become unstable, re-
sulting in a continuous dynamical transition at ρc.
IV. THE PHASE OF FINITE VARIANCE
However, when ρ < ρc, the step sizes for each of the
D signals may not be equal. To see this, we monitor the
variance for each of the D signals and rank them. The
rth maximum variance is then given by
Sr = largeµ
(
N
4
[〈(Aµ)2〉|µ=µ∗(t) − (〈Aµ〉|µ=µ∗(t))2], r
)
(4)
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FIG. 4: Sr versus ρ; Inset: σ
2/N versus ρ. Symbols: sim-
ulation; dotted line: theory with one bifurcation; solid lines:
theory with two bifurcations. N = 1001, m = 1, s = 2, 1000
samples.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
20
40
60
(a)
4
3
r=2
r=1
 
 
S r
 simulation
 theory
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
20
40
60
(b)
r=2
r=1
 
 
S r
FIG. 5: Sr versus ρ for (a) m = 2, (b) m = 3. In both cases,
N = 1001, s = 2, 1000 samples.
where largeµ(f(µ), r) is the rth largest function f(µ) for
µ = 1, ..., D.
As shown in Figs. 4-5, the step sizes for each of the
D signals do not bifurcate simultaneously at ρ = ρc,
Rather, only their first maximum bifurcates from zero
when ρ falls below ρc, while the step sizes for the re-
maining D-1 signals remain small. When the diversity
further decreases to around 0.05, the second maximum
becomes unstable as well, and a further bifurcation takes
place. For m ≥ 2, there are further bifurcations of the
third or higher order maxima, resulting in a cascade of
dynamical transitions when the diversity decreases.
This cascade of transitions is confirmed by analysis.
Form = 1, we can generalize Eq. (3) to convergence times
of the order
√
R. Assuming without loss of generality
that A1 bifurcates while A0 remains small, the variance
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FIG. 6: The number of samples with step size responding to
signal 1 being the maximum, out of 1000 samples for N =
1001, m = 1, and s = 2. The initial signal is 1.
of the buyer population, as derived in [16], is
σ2
N
=
N
32
(∆A1)2, ∆A1 = erf
(
∆A1√
8ρ
)
, (5)
where ∆A1 is the step size responding to signal 1. As
Fig. 4 inset shows, the analytical and simulation results
well agree down to ρ ∼ 0.05. However, when the diver-
sity decreases further, this simple analysis implies that
the variance will saturate to a constant N/32, whereas
simulation results are clearly higher.
This discrepancy is due to a further bifurcation of the
minimum step size. This can be analyzed by considering
the effect of a perturbation δA0(t) in the direction of A0.
After a period of 4 steps, the accumulated perturbation
becomes
δA0(t+ 4) =
[
1− 1√
2piρ
(1 + e−
(∆A1)2
8ρ )
]2
δA0(t). (6)
At ρ = 0.0459, where ∆A1 = 0.9775, the coefficient on
the right hand side of Eq. (6) reaches the value 1, and
δA0(t) diverges on further reduction of ρ. Numerical it-
erations of the analytical equations for Aµ(t), averaged
over samples of different initial conditions, yield the the-
oretical curves in Fig. 4 and inset, agreeing very well with
simulation results. Similarly, the agreement between an-
alytical and simulation results are satisfactory for m = 2.
Since the attractors have asymmetric responses to dif-
ferent signals, we also study their dependence on the ini-
tial states. Letting the system start from a certain state
(say, state 1 for m = 1) for a given sample, Fig. 6 shows
that the initial state is more likely to have the largest
step size in the attractor for m = 1. Simulations show
that higher values of m share the same trend.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the behavior of an adaptive popula-
tion using a payoff function that increases linearly with
the winning margin. We found a continuous dynamical
transition when the adaptation rate of the population
is tuned by varying their diversity of preferences. This
is in contrast with the case of payoff functions indepen-
dent of the winning margin, in which no phase transi-
tions are found. Furthermore, we found a cascade of dy-
namical transitions in the responses to different signals.
This shows that an adaptive population has the ability to
self-organize to globally efficient states and display a rich
behavior, although the individual agents make selfish de-
cisions. Hence, despite the simplicity of the population
models, they are able to capture the essential features of
economic markets and distributed control.
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